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Summary
The authors are presenting and interpreting the data on Croatian citizens’ at-
titudes on regulating hate speech, contentious symbols and public commemo-
ration. The data was collected in two nation-wide surveys conducted in 2016 
and 2018. The data is analyzed within a normative framework of militant 
democracy versus anti-democratic tendencies. In the conclusion the authors, 
invoking the available data, advocate a minimal model of regulating public 
speech by focusing on public utterances of direct and symbolic hate speech.
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Introduction
This article deals with Croatian citizens’ attitudes on banning hate speech, use of 
political symbols connected to totalitarian regimes and regulating collective me-
mory through erecting public monuments and naming streets and town squares. 
Survey research on hate speech and contentious political symbols has been conduct-
ed in two waves on nationally representative samples (n=1000 participants each), 
the first one in October 2016, and the second one in January 2018. All the questions 
asked in the first wave have been replicated and several new ones were added to im-
prove the coverage of important issues, especially relating to the symbolic political 
speech and issues of public commemoration and politics of memory. 
The first aim of the survey was to explore the Croatian citizens’ attitudes to-
wards legal ban of direct hate speech. The idea of hate speech, both as a theoretical 
and legal concept, is contentious. Political theorists, both supportive and dismissive 
of the usage of the concept of hate speech, point out that there is no consistent defi-
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nition of this concept (Malik, 2012; Heinze, 2016; Waldron, 2012). Legal scholars 
warn us that if we look comparatively at how different countries define and regu-
late hate speech in their legislation, we will find that there is “no universal stan-
dard for sanctioning hate speech” (Foxman and Wolf, 2013: 74; see also: Brown, 
2015). However, difficulties relating to arriving at a comprehensive definition of 
hate speech should not blur the fact that some form of legislation designed to sanc-
tion hate speech is part of both international human rights standards developed af-
ter WWII (UDHR and ICCPR), the supranational level of the Council of Europe 
through rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the national 
legal framework of almost all constitutional democracies in the world today.1 Al-
though democratic countries approach the issue of hate speech in different ways, 
normatively speaking, variety in national legislation of different countries on hate 
speech can be seen as an advantage that allows international legal norms to be ap-
plied more meaningfully and consistently in a local context.2
As our survey covered the attitudes of Croatian citizens, our main reference 
point was the Croatian legal framework and Croatia’s historical and political con-
text in defining what should be put under the heading of hate speech and, more 
broadly, extreme political speech. Although there is no direct mentioning of hate 
speech in the Croatian Constitution and Criminal Code, both of these legal docu-
ments address the problem of public expressions of hate directed at members of 
specific groups.3 We have also taken into account the specific historical legacy 
of contentious political symbols and slogans connected to fascist Ustasha regime 
during WWII and Tito’s communist dictatorship in the second part of the 20th cen-
tury.
Nevertheless, given the contentious aspect of the concept of hate speech, rather 
than using a comprehensive definition of hate speech in our survey, we have relied 
1 One exemption here is the USA whose 1st Amendment of the Constitution forbids govern-
ment to make any laws limiting free speech of its citizens. For a more detailed account of the 
relationship between the 1st Amendment of the US Constitution and hate speech, see: Abrams, 
2012; Strum, 1999; Walker, 1994.
2 This is an argument put forward by Bhikhu Parekh: “Every form of speech occurs within a 
particular historical and cultural context, and its content, import, insinuations, and moral and 
emotional significance are inseparable from, and can only be determined in the light of, that con-
text” (Parekh, 2012: 41). 
3 The Constitution proclaims in Article 39 that “any call for or incitement to war or use of vio-
lence, to national, racial or religious hatred, or any form of intolerance shall be prohibited and 
punishable by law”. In the same vein, Article 325 of the Criminal Code bans “instigating vio-
lence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group on account of 
their race, religion, national or ethnic origin, descent, colour, gender, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, disability or any other characteristics”.
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on several key features to describe such speech. The first key feature is its public 
character, while its second core feature is that such speech – which can be verbal, 
written or expressed through symbols – has to target individual members of groups 
or groups as a whole based on their ascriptive characteristics such as race, gender, 
nationality, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, etc. (see: Kulenović, 
2016). To make questions as clear as possible we focused on the two most obvious 
and least controversial aspects of public hate speech: calls for violence and calls 
for discrimination against members of specific groups (leaving aside complex is-
sues of what discrimination might actually entail or how to define specific groups 
whose members are victims of hate speech). Apart from public calls for violence 
or discrimination as forms of direct hate speech, we also addressed the question of 
symbolic hate speech, best represented in public display of Nazi signs and slogans. 
Such displays reveal support for ideology and political regime dedicated to discri-
mination, oppression, mass murder and even extermination of groups deemed by 
this ideology as inferior and parasitic. Therefore, although use of such symbols or 
slogans does not represent a direct form of hate speech, it can justifiably be under-
stood as a form of symbolic hate speech. 
Our survey went beyond what could be recognized as direct or symbolic hate 
speech and explored citizens’ attitudes towards banning controversial political sym-
bols, essentially symbols associated with fascism and communism. Public use of 
Nazi insignia or slogans can be perceived as both symbolic hate speech and a form 
of extreme speech through public declaration of sympathy and support for Nazi 
ideology and fascist regimes.4 Communist symbols and slogans usually do not fall 
under the heading of hate speech as they do not convey a message of racial or any 
other inferiority of the members of specific groups, but they can be interpreted as 
giving public support to anti-democratic and totalitarian political solutions. Hence, 
use of these symbols and slogans can be described as contentious and a form of ex-
treme speech. The survey also covered signs and slogans used historically in Cro-
atia during WWII by the Ustasha movement and regime and communist partisans 
and, later, Tito’s regime. Furthermore, in the 2018 survey, we extended our research 
to cover questions of collective political memory by addressing the issue of re-
moving the monuments and names of town squares and streets venerating persons 
or events from NDH (Independent State of Croatia) or NOB (People’s Liberation 
Struggle) history.
The main research questions in this article are:
4 Here we use ‘fascist’ as an umbrella term that covers far-right nationalistic movements and 
their ideology, including different historical regimes that embodied this ideology (such as Nazi 
Third Reich, Mussolini’s fascist Italy or Croatian Ustasha). 
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1. How prone are Croatian citizens to ban hate speech and extreme speech?
2. Are there some more general tendencies in their willingness to ban hate 
speech and extreme speech?
3. Can we discern which of these tendencies reflect a strong support for the 
idea of militant democracy (protection of democracy from ideas and move-
ments that are deeply undemocratic), and which are an expression of anti-
pluralist and anti-democratic attitude (to exclude one’s ideological oppo-
nents from the public space)?
4. What are possible approaches to regulating hate speech and extreme speech 
and what are the advantages and disadvantages of each of these approaches?
The article is structured in such a way that each section tries to answer one of 
these research questions. In the first part we present the data collected by the survey 
and offer an initial interpretation of some of the results. In the second part we look 
at the possible reasons for the high level of support that Croatian citizens have for 
banning hate speech and extreme political speech. The third part introduces other 
variables – support for democratic values and institutions, anti-democratic and an-
ti-pluralist attitudes, conspiratorial beliefs and family heritage – to further explain 
the high level of support for regulating hate speech and contentious symbols. In the 
concluding part we address the normative question of pros and cons of different 
models of regulating both direct and symbolic hate speech, extreme speech and col-
lective memory through control of public space.
Results
To answer our first research question we asked our participants if several discrimi-
natory activities and use of symbols of fascist and communist regimes should be 
legally sanctioned, as well as if street names and monuments which celebrate lo-
cal traditions of those regimes should be removed from public spaces. In 2016 we 
posed five such questions, which are accompanied with six more in the 2018 sur-
vey. Results are shown in the next two figures (on pages 180 and 181).
First of all, around 80% of citizens would like to ban direct hate speech that 
expresses violence and discrimination of certain groups, as well as use of Nazi 
symbols. These tendencies show an increase from 2016 to 2018.5 On the other 
hand, there is a decrease in the percentage of those who would like to legally sanc-
tion communist symbols, such as the red star, from 61% in 2016 to 55% in 2018, 
as well as an increase of proclivity to ban the local fascist slogan For the Home-
5 Performed Mann-Whitney U tests for all three items with comparable data are statistically sig-
nificant. U1=480523.500, p=0.002; U2=470713.500, p=0.000; U3=476522.500, p=0.001.
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 4, 2018, pp. 176-202
180
land Ready (Za dom spremni), from 45% to 50%.6 Furthermore, in 2018, 47% of 
Croatian citizens were prone to ban the local antifascist slogan Death to Fascism, 
Freedom to the People (Smrt fašizmu, sloboda narodu), opposed by 41% of their 
fellow citizens.
In our second survey in 2018, the proclivity to remove antifascist monuments 
and names of streets and squares was generally smaller than for monuments, streets 
and squares dedicated to the puppet fascist state of NDH. Unfortunately, this cannot 
be said for the Homeland War monuments that contain the slogan For the Home-
land Ready. More than 47% of citizens oppose their removal. Those results are 
shown in the next figure. 
The first issue we want to address is the high level of citizens’ support for 
regulating public speech, the support that goes beyond what the current Croatian 
legal framework for sanctioning extreme speech requires. The majority of citizens 
in Croatia would support bans of hate speech, both in its direct and symbolic forms, 
in cases where such speech can be described as hate speech or voicing support for 
6 U4=466912.500, p=0.000; U5=457656.500, p=0.000.
Figure 1. Tendency toward Legal Sanctions against Direct and Hate Speech 
and Contentious Symbols and Slogans (2016-2018)
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undemocratic regimes, institutions and values. The support for banning direct hate 
speech where such speech is advocating violence or discrimination against mem-
bers of certain groups is at 81.4% in our 2016 survey and at 86.9% in the 2018 sur-
vey. This reflects the support for the existing legal framework on hate speech, as 
defined by Article 39 of the Constitution and by Article 325 of the Criminal Code. 
In the case of symbolic speech, there is a strong support for removing both Nazi and 
communist symbols from the public space. Legally sanctioning Nazi symbols, such 
as the swastika, can be interpreted in two ways: as a ban on symbolic hate speech 
directed at minority groups (first and foremost, Jewish and Roma people)7 and/or as 
a ban on voicing public support for totalitarian regimes and values of National So-
cialism. In 2016 and 2018 support for such a ban was at 76.9% and 82.5%, respec-
tively. Here again the values of the majority of Croatian citizens are reflected in an 
existing legal framework that sanctions the use of symbols of National Socialism 
in the public space.
7 An essential part of the Nazi ideology is the racial theory by which Jewish and Roma peo-
ple belong to parasitic races that should be eradicated. Hence, wearing a swastika is a symbolic 
equivalent of yelling “Kill all the Jews and Gypsies!”
Figure 2. Proclivity to Remove Monuments and Names of Streets and Squares 
Dedicated to NOB, NDH and the Homeland War
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The percentage of Croatian citizens advocating legal ban on public display of 
communist symbols such as the red star or hammer and sickle is somewhat smaller, 
although it still involves the majority: 61% in 2016 and 54.9% in 2018. As stated 
earlier, communist ideology does not contain advocacy of eradication of a whole 
people based on their racial or other ascriptive characteristics, therefore public use 
of such symbols should not be seen as a form of hate speech. However, using com-
munist symbols, especially in the Croatian context, can be justifiably perceived as 
public promotion of undemocratic, authoritarian and even totalitarian regimes and 
ideology that has, historically, been invoked to justify grave violations of human 
rights. On the other hand, public use of communist symbols is much more am-
biguous than use of Nazi symbols, as symbols such as red star can be interpreted 
in both negative (as an advocacy and an apology of undemocratic and authorita-
rian regimes) or positive way (as a support for labour movements, workers’ rights 
or antifascist struggle). This was the argument invoked by ECHR in their 2008 rul-
ing on Vajnai vs. Hungary.8 Attila Vajnai, vice-president of the Workers’ Party was 
convicted by Hungarian courts for wearing a red star on his jacket during a de-
monstration as a violation of the law that forbids displaying totalitarian symbols in 
public. ECHR overruled that conviction as a violation of the freedom of expression, 
explaining that: “The Court is mindful of the fact that the well-known mass viola-
tions of human rights committed under communism discredited the symbolic value 
of the red star. However, in the Court’s view, it cannot be understood as representing 
exclusively communist totalitarian rule, as the Government have implicitly conced-
ed... It is clear that this star also still symbolizes the international workers’ move-
ment, struggling for a fairer society, as well as certain lawful political parties active 
in different member States”.9 The existing Croatian legal framework follows the 
logic of ECHR’s argument by allowing the use of communist symbols in the public 
sphere. The majority’s opinion that such symbols should be legally banned is even 
more controversial if we take into account that the introductory part of the Croa-
tian Constitution, in listing the historical foundations of Croatian statehood, refers 
to the Territorial Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Croatia (1943), 
the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Croatia (1947) and subsequent consti-
tutions of the Socialist Republic of Croatia (1963-1990). Therefore, the communist 
symbols play an important part in the historical narrative of the continuity of Croa-
tian statehood as presented in the Constitution. 
This kind of ambiguity in public display of political symbols is reflected in the 
results for the two questions in our survey that refer to more local issues of ban-
ning the call For the Homeland Ready and the call Death to Fascism, Freedom to 
8 ECtHR, Vajnai vs. Hungary, Application no. 33629/06.
9 Ibid., para 52. 
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the People. The first one, For the Homeland Ready was used by members of the 
Ustasha movement during the WWII period in NDH, a quisling regime collaborat-
ing with Mussolini’s fascists and the Third Reich. Not only did this regime commit 
grave human rights violations and crimes against humanity against members of the 
Serbian minority, it also passed racial laws and conducted genocidal policy against 
Croatia’s Jewish and Roma population. For this reason, the public call of For the 
Homeland Ready represents both the use of symbolic hate speech and promotion 
of genocidal regime and genocidal policy. However, the support among Croatian 
citizens for banning For the Homeland Ready is much lower – at 45.1% in 2016 
and 49.9% in 2018 – than for banning public use of Nazi symbols. Possible reasons 
for this discrepancy could be explained by the fact that the call and insignia For 
the Homeland Ready was also used during the Homeland War in the 90s by certain 
voluntary army units. Hence, those Croatian citizens that would ban Nazi symbols, 
but would allow For the Homeland Ready probably ascribe more positive value of 
struggle for national independence and support for war veterans to the latter, ignor-
ing the negative aspects of using this slogan in public.10
In our 2018 survey we extended the questionnaire to include the question 
should there be a legal ban on public use of the call Death to Fascism, Freedom 
to the People, the slogan that was used by communist partisans in WWII and later, 
in communist Yugoslavia, as a rallying cry for Tito’s regime. The ambiguity arises 
because of the historical complexity where Death to Fascism, Freedom to the Peo-
ple can be interpreted as both an expression of affirmation of antifascism and/or 
as a validation of Tito’s dictatorship. This ambiguity is echoed in the results of the 
survey where 46.8% of citizens would support the ban on public use of the slogan 
Death to Fascism, Freedom to the People, while 41.1% believe this slogan should 
not be banned. The current legal framework bans the use of For the Homeland 
Ready, but does not ban Death to Fascism, Freedom to the People. Again, the ma-
jority of citizens advocate a stronger ban on the use of contentious political symbols 
in the public space than is required by existing laws regulating public speech. 
Our 2018 survey also included questions dealing with symbolic speech and 
collective memory by asking if streets and town squares named after prominent 
members of NDH and NOB should be renamed and if monuments to NDH or NOB 
should be removed from public spaces. In this case, the majority of citizens make a 
clear distinction between the historical legacy of NDH versus the historical legacy of 
10 This reinterpretation of “Za dom spremni” disregards a deeply problematic point that those 
who were using that call in the Homeland War were themselves, consciously or less consciously, 
involved in revisionist justification of Ustasha regime as a genuine movement for Croatian in-
dependence and rationalization of the prosecution of the Serbian minority as a legitimate pursuit 
of Croatian national interests.
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 4, 2018, pp. 176-202
184
NOB: 49.3% would not allow streets and town squares to be named after prominent 
members of NDH, while only 33.6% feel the same about historical figures connect-
ed to NOB. When it comes to public monuments the results are similar to the pre-
vious case, with 48.5% citizens not supporting monuments to NDH and 32.5% not 
supporting monuments to NOB. However, when we asked if the monuments to the 
Homeland War that contain For the Homeland Ready should be removed from pub-
lic spaces, 40.5% of citizens believe that they should be removed, while 47.1% hold 
an opposite view. Once again, the results show that a certain percentage of citizens 
hold that For the Homeland Ready does not necessarily mean an expression of sup-
port for the ideas of National Socialism or support for NDH and its fascist and racist 
ideology, but in a certain context can be viewed in a positive light as a support for 
veterans of the Homeland War and struggle for Croatia’s independence in the 1990s.
Militant Democracy and/or Anti-democratic Tendencies
How should we interpret the results from both 2016 and 2018 surveys that clearly 
show a higher level of support by Croatian citizens for banning forms of public 
speech than the current legal framework dealing with hate speech and other forms 
of extreme political speech requires? One possible approach is to look at this strong 
tendency to control and regulate extreme political speech in two possible ways: 
first, as a support for the ideal of militant democracy or, second, as evidence of 
anti-democratic and anti-pluralist sentiments. The former explanation would show 
a strong dedication to protecting democratic institutions and pluralist values of to-
lerance, inclusion and equal standing. The latter would suggest propensity for the 
anti-democratic solution of using the monopoly of the state to ban one’s ideological 
opponents from entering and participating in the public sphere. 
The concept of militant democracy (streitbare Demokratie) was introduced by 
German legal scholar Karl Loewenstein in two articles published in American Po-
litical Science Review in 1937 (Loewenstein, 1937a; 1937b).11 The core idea that 
Loewenstein presented is that democracies can and should protect themselves from 
the ideas and movements that are deeply undemocratic and whose goal is to use 
freedoms provided by democracies to destroy democracy itself. “Democracy and 
democratic tolerance”, argued Loewenstein, “have been used for their own destruc-
tion” (Loewenstein, 1937a: 423). The scenario that Loewenstein had in mind was, 
of course, takeover of the German state by the Nazis and the destruction of the Wei-
mar Republic. The protection of democratic institutions and values should manifest 
itself in two main areas. The first one is a legal ban of those political parties that re-
fuse to accept basic democratic values of equal citizenship, fair political competition 
11 For a more detailed account of Loewenstein’s work and the development of the concept of 
militant democracy itself, see: Cliteur and Rijpkema, 2012. 
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through elections, rejection of violence as a political tactic and recognition of politi-
cal and social rights of all citizens. The second one is a ban on certain forms of public 
speech and especially propaganda directed against citizens’ ascriptive characteristics 
and group membership. When discussing how different European states have suc-
cessfully applied instruments of militant democracy, Loewenstein advocates “forbid-
ding incitement and agitation against and baiting of particular sections of the people 
because of their race, political attitude, or religious creed – in particular, because 
of their allegiance to the existing republican and democratic form of government” 
(Loewenstein, 1937b: 651). In short, he is talking about the ban on hate speech that 
was later extended, as the model of militant democracy developed, to sanctioning 
denial of genocide or crimes against humanity, as well as glorification of totalita-
rian regimes.12 The survival of the democratic order takes precedence over the right 
of free association and assembly, as well as right to free speech. In the aftermath of 
WWII, this idea was incorporated in the Constitution of Western Germany, but also 
in the Croatian Constitution that bans incitement to war and violence, calls for racial, 
religious or ethnic hate and intolerance (Article 39) and political parties that through 
their program or actions undermine or endanger the free democratic order (Article 6). 
Strong support for banning direct hate speech, symbolic hate speech and types 
of extreme public speech that shows support for symbols of totalitarian regimes 
could be interpreted as a dedication to upholding the democratic order and its va-
lues though legal and institutional implementation of the idea of militant democra-
cy. However, a more sinister interpretation of the willingness of Croatian citizens to 
regulate public speech in a more comprehensive way than the current legal frame-
work allows, would be exactly the opposite of embracing the ideal of militant de-
mocracy. This interpretation would question citizens’ dedication to democratic va-
lues and the democratic institutional order by suggesting that readiness to limit free 
speech derives from anti-pluralist tendency to silence one’s political opponents, as 
well as those with whose ideology and worldview one disagrees. One obvious way 
to decide between the two options would be to look at the level of consistency when 
it comes to advocating legal regulation of free speech. So, for example, if one thinks 
a state should allow racist, homophobic or sexists public speech, but would ban the 
red star or Death to Fascism, Freedom to the People, this would clearly suggest 
anti-pluralist and anti-democratic tendencies. A more complex approach requires 
taking into account variables such as support for democratic values and institutions, 
anti-democratic and anti-pluralist attitudes, conspiratorial beliefs about democra-
12 This later extension echoes Loewenstein’s warning that “it should be remembered that under 
the Weimar Republic, owing to the ill-advised yet inveterate attitude of the courts in interpret-
ing the criminal code, Jews and Marxists as members of a group were left entirely without pro-
tection if they could not prove that the attack was directed personally against the complainant” 
(Loewenstein, 1937b: 651).
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tic institutions and other public agents, interpretations of WWII conflict in Cro-
atia, and finally the family political heritage, in order to test the influence of local 
historical issues on Croatian citizens’ attitudes about hate speech. Taking insights 
from Loewenstein’s approach and his emphasis on “unchallengeable command”, 
“high-pitched national enthusiasm”, “the ‘leadership’ principle and abolition of li-
beral democracy and its institutions” and the political technique of “relentless self-
advertisement and propaganda” (Loewenstein, 1937a: 418, 421, 426) as clear signs 
of authoritarian leanings, we have looked at such variables as diffuse and more spe-
cific support for democracy, sense of endangered Nation, trust in political and social 
institutions, social distance towards ethnic minorities and need for a strong leader 
as general tendencies. Comparing these general tendencies to citizens’ proclivity to 
ban hate speech and public use of contentious political symbols can help us under-
stand if this proclivity is a reflection of support for militant democracy or/and an 
indication of anti-democratic and anti-pluralist predispositions.
General Tendencies for Legal Sanctioning of Symbols of Totalitarian Regimes
To discern if there are some more general tendencies in their willingness to ban dif-
ferent forms of hate speech as well as contentious symbols, we have conducted an 
exploratory Nonlinear Principal Component Analysis for categorical data (CAT-
PCA) in SPSS 22.13 The best solution was the initial extraction that revealed three 
clearly interpretable components with eigen-values bigger than 1. Items related to 
direct hate speech and legal ban on Nazi symbols were excluded due to their small 
variability and consequent disturbance of simple solution.14 The chosen solution is 
shown in the next table.
Our analysis revealed three latent dimensions (principal components), which 
together explain more than 85% of the variance. The first one is a general tendency 
toward legal sanctions against all symbols of totalitarian regimes. The other two 
are ideologically specific and selective proclivities. The second component is ex-
pressed as selective proclivity to ban only communist symbols, and the third one 
is the completely opposite tendency to ban only fascist symbols. Usually, it would 
be logical to expect a negative correlation between these two selective tendencies. 
Nevertheless, our results suggest a sort of compartmentalization and parallel modes 
of thinking in terms of what kind of contentious symbols to ban that can be diffe-
rentially activated in exact cases, due to overdetermined meaning and various his-
13 For the purpose of analysis we have recoded our data into ordinary scales where the answer 
NO=1, DK=2, YES=3.
14 As rotation options are not available within CATPCA in SPSS 22, the VARIMAX, PROMAX 
and DIRECT OBLIMIN rotations were then performed by saving the transformed variables and 
submitting them to a linear PCA with those rotations. Nevertheless, the initial extraction was the 
most interpretable solution and completely the same as the one obtained by CATPCA.
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torical experiences with political and military agents who were acting under those 
ideological signs and slogans in different periods of the 20th century. For example, 
someone can express a general tendency to prohibit all signs because of their anti-
democratic character. The same person can also be prone to ban fascist symbols 
because his or her great-grandfather was a member of NOB movement, and si-
multaneously to be against communist symbols and prone to preserve monuments 
dedicated to the Homeland War that contain For the Homeland Ready because, for 
example, his or her relative was killed by the Yugoslav People’s Army as a mem-
ber of military units fighting under the slogan For the Homeland Ready. Different 
seemingly controversial cases of historical experiences are also possible. As it real-
istically reflects a variety of possible explanations, it seems reasonable to retain the 
chosen component structure. That leads us to the next research problem.








symbols and to 
preserve fascist 
symbols 
Proclivity to ban 
fascist symbols 
and to preserve 
communist 
symbols
Streets and squares named after prominent 
members of NOB .796 –.422
Streets and squares named after prominent 
members of NDH .827 –.415
Monuments dedicated to NOB .795 –.438
Monuments dedicated to NDH .820 –.421
Monuments dedicated to the Homeland War 
that contain “Za dom spremni” 
(For the Homeland Ready)
.717 –.475
Public use of Communist symbols 
(e.g. the Red Star) .432 .758
Public use of call “Za dom spremni” 
(For the Homeland Ready) .577 .706
Public use of call “Smrt fašizmu, 
sloboda narodu” (Death to Fascism, 
Freedom to the People)
.482 .753
Eigen-value 3.888 1.882 1.077
% of the explained variance 48.5 23.5 13.5
KMO 0,729
Bartlett’s test of the signifi cance 
of the correlation matrix Chi-square=6250.814, df=28, sig=0.000
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To discern which of these aggregated tendencies reflect a strong support for 
the idea of militant democracy and which are an expression of anti-pluralist and 
anti-democratic attitude we obtained separate regression analyses for each of the 
components as criterion variables.15 For this purpose we used in our analysis seve-
ral hypothetical predictors in the form of direct pro- and anti-democratic attitudes, 
then specific attitudes which are usually related to lower support for the democratic 
order, and finally several attitudes related to World War II and its ideological de-
rivatives important for the development of discourse about NOB and NDH tradi-
tions. To be more precise, we have performed hierarchical regression analysis on 
each tendency to ban signs and slogans by using four groups of predictors. The first 
group included variables of direct democratic support, such as diffuse and specific 
support for democracy (Easton, 1975; 1976), general trust in political and social 
institutions, need for an inclusive government (in terms of normative opinion how 
often the government should include various political and social actors in their deci-
sion-making processes), general support for civil society, as well as several indica-
tors of anti-democratic attitudes, such as authoritarianism, need for a strong leader, 
and populist attitudes (Castanho Silva et al., 2018). The second group of predictors 
included several indicators that can lead to the “suspension” of democratic values 
and pluralism, such as the sense of endangered national community, social distance 
toward ethnic and other minorities, and anti-immigration attitude. The third group 
of predictors focuses on the peculiar form of distrust expressed in different forms of 
beliefs in conspiracy theories. These conspiracy theories deal with assumed crimi-
nal and immoral activities of the whole range of political and economic agents, on 
local, state, international and global levels. This group included scales such as gene-
ral conspiratorial mentality (Bruder et al., 2013), belief in global conspiracy theo-
ries, belief in local conspiracy theories related to internal and external politics in 
Croatia (Blanuša, 2011; 2013), as well as two newly developed scales to measure 
the support for non-transparent “shadow government” and belief in anti-elitist con-
spiracy theories. As the symbols of totalitarian regimes used in this study are related 
to World War II and the period of Yugoslavia, the last group of predictors expresses 
attitudes toward the role of fascist and antifascist legacy in Croatia, as well as opini-
ons about prominent and controversial local political leaders from the 20th century. 
As we observed in our previous research (Blanuša, 2013) that the political cleavage 
from World War II reproduces itself in actual left-right discourse and political po-
sitioning of Croatian citizens, the last predictor involved was the left-right self-per-
ception. All groups of predictors are listed in the next table, together with hypotheses 
as to whether they contribute to the support of democracy (marked as “+”) or to the 
15 We used this technique because of the generally explorative character of our study and the non-
existence of previous theoretical models that could be tested in certain conformational procedures.
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anti-democratic attitude (marked as “–”). The opinions that were unclear in terms of 
support or opposition to democracy or potentially controversial are marked with “0”. 
As we are interested to get an insight into how much each of these groups of 
predictors separately contribute to the explanation of each tendency to ban conten-
tious symbols, as well as their summative contribution, in the next table we shall 
present separate regressions for each of four groups of predictors and then the final 
hierarchical analysis. In all those analyses we used the stepwise method to deter-
mine significant predictors. Their predictive power is estimated through standard-
ized β coefficients.
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According to our results, the last group of predictors related to historical heri-
tage – in the form of political cleavages between fascism and antifascism, includ-
ing opinions about prominent and controversial political leaders – has the biggest 
predictive power for all criterion variables, especially for the proclivity to ban com-
munist symbols and to preserve fascist symbols. Nevertheless, other groups of pre-
dictors also show their “influence” and explain a significant portion of the variance 
mostly in the line of our general hypotheses. In that sense, 10% of the variance of 
general tendency to ban symbols of totalitarian regimes can be explained by di-
rect (anti)-democratic support. Particularly, skeptical citizens toward strong leaders, 
who criticize the functioning of political and social institutions, but simultaneously 
support democratic performance and civil society are more prone to express ten-
dency to ban all symbols of totalitarian regimes. All this can be interpreted as a need 
for more effective institutional control of public use of contentious symbols. These 
results are in line with the hypothesis of militant democracy. They feel less that their 
nation is generally endangered, especially not by global agents and financial insti-
tutions, but simultaneously are slightly more prone to anti-immigrants attitude and 
belief in global conspiracy theories. The last two attitudes can be considered as an 
expression of need for more institutional control and protection by the state, espe-
cially due to recent immigration crisis, which was often interpreted through global 
conspiracy theories. But more security is often related to less democracy, especially 
in terms of human rights. Tendency to ban all totalitarian symbols is also strongly 
supported by negative opinion about NDH leader, Ante Pavelić, and another nation-
alist politician, Ante Starčević, which is consistent with an expression of slightly 
left-wing self-identification and consistent with the pro-democratic attitude. On the 
other hand, positive attitude toward the first Croatian president Franjo Tuđman also 
contributes slightly to the tendency toward legally sanctioning all the forms of hate 
speech and contentious symbols, but his rule was marked by serious threats to the 
democratic order. Furthermore, tendency to collective self-victimization is usually 
related to exclusivist national identity and anti-pluralist relationship to other groups. 
For all these reasons it seems that general tendency to ban all contentious symbols is 
only partially imbued with democratic inclinations. It is also significantly informed 
by the need for security and anti-pluralist attitudes. The same inclination, expressed 
in a smaller number of predictors, is also observed in our full hierarchical regression 
analysis shown in table 3.16
The most explained criterion variable in our hierarchical model is the procliv-
ity to ban communist symbols and to preserve fascist symbols. Both separate and 
hierarchical analyses show that its best predictors are those related to political clea-
vages, but most of them are anti-democratically oriented. The citizens who show 
this proclivity have a positive attitude toward Ante Pavelić and Franjo Tuđman and 
16 
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support NDH as an authentic movement. They are prone to authoritarianism, anti-
immigration attitude, conspiratorial mentality, and tend to support “shadow govern-
ment”, and simultaneously oppose the idea that the Croatian government was in-
volved in various conspiracies during the 1990s. According to these results, they are 
probably supporters of the right-wing historical revisionism. Besides, they strongly 
support the work of ultra-conservative pressure groups such as “U ime obitelji” (In 
the name of family) and “Vigilare”.17 As a result of One-Way ANOVA, the next table 
also shows that proclivity to ban communist symbols and to preserve fascist sym-
bols is logically distributed according to the family political heritage from World 
War II. The heirs of the NDH tradition strongly support this proclivity, while the 
heirs of the NOB tradition strongly oppose it.
The least explained criterion variable in our models is the proclivity to ban 
fascist symbols and to preserve communist symbols. Although the strength of pre-
dictors is rather small, their political profile is relatively clear. Those citizens show 
tendency toward populist attitudes, together with similar inclinations, such as belief 
in anti-elitist conspiracy theories. They are also opposed to non-transparent shadow 
government, express general conspiratorial mentality, and take the side of antifas-
cism in the political cleavage from World War II, by having a positive attitude to-
ward Josip Broz Tito and a negative attitude toward Ante Pavelić, along with nega-
17 Proclivity to ban communist symbols and to preserve fascist symbols highly correlates with 
the support of these two groups (r1=.504**, r2=.525**).
Table 4. Proclivity to Ban Communist Symbols and to Preserve Fascist Symbols 
and Family Political Heritage
How would you describe your family’s dominant 
position during World War II? N
Subset for alpha=0.10
1 2 3 4
Partizan movement (NOB) – antifascists 126 –.7632
On several military-political sides in the confl ict 92 –0.2030
Don’t know 157 0.0463 0.0463
Out of confl ict 456 0.0810 0.0810
Home Guards (NDH) – regular army units 104 0.2944
Ustasha (NDH) – fascists 61 0.6595
Sig. 1 .399 .560 .132
F=26.345, df=5.993, sig.=.000
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
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tive attitudes toward Franjo Tuđman and, somewhat surprisingly, Stjepan Radić. In 
line with the general argument, they believe that Croatian antifascism (NOB) was 
an authentic movement unlike the puppet fascist state of NDH. What they are try-
ing to preserve is the positive legacy of the Croatian antifascist movement that was 
severely demonized in the last few decades in Croatia, which can explain their ex-
cessive mistrust revealed in conspiratorial thinking and populist attitudes. As a re-
sult of One-Way ANOVA, the next table also shows that the proclivity to ban fascist 
symbols and to preserve communist symbols is logically distributed according to 
the family political heritage from World War II. The heirs of the NOB tradition sup-
port this proclivity, while the heirs of the NDH tradition oppose it.
Normative Models of Regulating Hate Speech and Extreme Speech
In the concluding part we want to address the question of normative possibilities 
relating to legal regulation of hate speech using insights from the available data and 
our previous analysis. We will present four such possibilities and discuss the advan-
tages and disadvantages of each of them in turn. The first option would be an exist-
ing legal framework that bans direct hate speech and public display of symbols and 
slogans associated with Nazism or the Ustasha regime, but puts no legal restrictions 
on public use of communist symbols or slogans. The ban on direct hate speech af-
firms the state’s commitment to protect members of different groups, especially mi-
nority groups, from having their standing as equal citizens – by invoking violence 
or discrimination – put into question. As one of the core values of constitutional de-
Table 5. Proclivity to Ban Fascist Symbols and to Preserve Communist Symbols 
and Family Political Heritage
How would you describe your family’s dominant 
position during World War II? N
Subset for alpha=0.10
Ustasha (NDH) – fascists 61 –.3137
On several military-political sides in the confl ict 92 –.2241
Home Guards (NDH) – regular army units 104 –.1595
Don’t know 157 –.0330 –.0330
Out of confl ict 456 .0467 .0467
Partizan movement (NOB) – antifascists 126 .3207
Sig. .185 .204
F=5.649, df=5.993, sig.=.000
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
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mocracy is the idea of equal citizenship, sanctioning direct hate speech serves two 
aims: first, to affirm equal standing of all citizens independently of race, ethnicity, 
gender, religion, sexual orientation or other ascriptive characteristics; second, to 
acknowledge the state’s commitment to democratic values of inclusiveness, tolera-
tion and equality.18
When it comes to symbolic hate speech, the normative logic behind making a 
distinction between fascist vs. communist symbols rests on the perception of his-
torical legacies and dangers that such legacies can have for maintaining basic demo-
cratic values and institutions. Both the fascist and communist political regimes have 
committed grave human rights violations such as war crimes, crimes against huma-
nity and, in the case of the Third Reich and its collaborator NDH, genocide. There 
is, however, a clear difference in fascist and communist ideologies and the values 
that these ideological frameworks invoke. The anti-humanism, call for unquestion-
ing loyalty to strong leaders, necessity of violence and theories of racial superiority 
that form an integral part of fascist ideology are anathema to any democratic order 
in such a way that core communist values of equality, fair distribution and putting an 
end to economic exploitation are not. Totalitarian order and massive human rights 
abuses are a betrayal of the communist ideal, but a realization of the fascist ideal. As 
public display of symbols can be seen as giving support to a certain political order 
or a certain set of values, there is no ambiguity in public use of fascist symbols and 
slogans, in the way there is when it comes to communist symbols. Additionally, use 
of fascist symbols always conveys a message of willingness to overthrow an exist-
ing democratic order, which is not necessarily the case with the use of communist 
symbols. ECHR followed the line of these two arguments in the aforementioned 
Vajnai vs. Hungary case, when it maintained that public use of communist symbols 
does not necessarily represent the support for totalitarian regimes nor willingness to 
endanger democratic order through violent means, as it can also be interpreted as a 
dedication to workers’ rights and social equality and justice. 
The advantage of this first approach to regulate extreme political speech in the 
public space is that it corresponds to the legal tradition of dealing with hate speech 
endorsed by most of the EU members, as well as ECHR. Also, in the Croatian con-
text, banning fascist symbols while allowing communist symbols corresponds to 
the way the two opposing ideologies are presented in the Croatian Constitution 
where the legacy of NOB is endorsed as a part of the historical narrative of Croatian 
18 Legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron talks about harm in hate speech that manifests itself in two 
ways. First, hate speech is an affront to the political standing of equal citizenship of an indivi-
dual. Second, hate speech is an attack on the basic values and institutions of constitutional demo-
cracy. In his words: “hate speech is both a calculated affront to the dignity of vulnerable members 
of society and a calculated assault on the public good of inclusiveness” (Waldron, 2012: 5-6). 
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statehood, while the legacy of NDH is rejected. The disadvantage of this approach 
lies in the fact that citizens might feel that this normative distinction between politi-
cal regimes and ideology is mere theoretical nitpicking and somewhat arbitrary and 
inconsistent legal regulation of the symbols of only the far-right, but not the far-left 
ideology and the political order. 
This brings us to the second approach which argues for a ban on not only di-
rect hate speech and fascist symbols, but also a ban on communist symbols. This 
would be an approach supported by, as our data shows, the majority of Croatian 
citizens. Here communism and fascism, by focusing less on the ideology and more 
on the 20th-century historical record of communist and fascist states, are perceived 
as two extreme poles of anti-democratic, anti-pluralist and totalitarian politics. Ban 
of symbols associated with these extreme political options would help exclude from 
public space those committed to abolishing constitutional democracy, but also re-
ject both the fascist and the communist historical legacy that plagued Croatia. In 
this approach special emphasis is given to crimes and human rights violations com-
mitted under the banner of fascism and communism. The benefit of this approach is 
that it is committed to banning hate speech in all its forms, but also banning acts of 
public support for any anti-democratic regime or political solution. By taking a his-
torical record of atrocities committed by both communist and fascist regimes in the 
20th century, it consistently rejects both options as deeply undemocratic. The prob-
lem with this approach is that it fails to recognize a more ambiguous character of 
communist symbols that does not exist when it comes to fascist symbols, as values 
and ideals of communism do not imply rejection of a fair and democratic society in 
such a way that those of fascism inevitably do. This is the main reason why com-
munist symbols are not legally banned in European countries, even in the countries 
that were under the rule of communist dictatorship for almost half a century. 
The third option would be a kind of combination between the first and the se-
cond approach, but less restricted in its application by taking into account the local 
context in which certain symbols are used. This was the option that the Council for 
Dealing with the Consequences of the Rule of Undemocratic Regimes, a govern-
ment-established body of academics and scholars, opted for in their 2018 report.19 
The advantage of this approach is in giving a local context much more weight than 
the two previous approaches by acknowledging that symbols used in public space 
can convey multiple messages and, given a specific context, can acquire altered 
meaning in different situations. For example, waiving a red star flag and shouting 
Death to Fascism, Freedom to the People during commemoration of the Bleiburg 
victims is a clear provocation designed to justify extrajudicial killings committed 
19 See: Dokument dijaloga: temeljna polazišta i preporuke o posebnom normativnom uređenju 
simbola, znakovlja i drugih obilježja totalitarnih režima i pokreta, 2018. 
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by communist partisans in the wake of WWII. However, the same flag and the same 
slogan used in a different context – at a rally for workers’ rights or an antifascist 
demonstration – can have a more positive message. However, this approach can 
also be perceived as relying too much on political compromise and sacrificing cer-
tain normative standards for political expediency. When the report was published, it 
was criticized both by conservative and more liberal pundits and intellectuals. The 
former thought that the report, treating the use of communist symbols more favo-
rably than the fascist ones, failed to equate two totalitarianisms sufficiently. The 
latter argued that allowing the use of For the Homeland Ready in certain contexts 
would give legitimacy to far-right fascist symbols, legitimacy they do not deserve 
to have in a democratic society, pandering to revisionist history of vindicating NDH 
as a failed but justifiable political project. 
The final approach would entail embracing the “American model” on hate 
speech and the use of symbols of totalitarian regimes in public places.20 Basically, 
the state should allow any public utterance, verbal, written or symbolic, no matter 
how extreme it might seem, as long as it does not involve a direct physical threat to 
a member or members of certain groups. The normative logic this approach relies 
on is that of content neutrality where the state should refrain from regulating free 
speech unless it can be proven that such speech will directly lead to criminal acts. 
Hence, there would be no legal restriction on the use of either communist or fascist 
symbols, while hate speech would be banned only in those instances where such 
speech leads to direct harm and immediate danger to individuals. The advantage of 
this approach, as most proponents of the “American model” of free speech regu-
lation argue, is that it diminishes the chances of the abuse of state power through 
hate speech and extreme speech legislation (see: Post, 2012; Heinze, 2016). More 
importantly, this approach clearly acknowledges the importance of the right to free 
speech, even when this right is used for publicly conveying hateful messages, for 
the ideal of democratic legitimacy. As prominent legal scholar Ronald Dworkin ar-
gued, the democratic state loses its legitimacy when it imposes laws on its citizens 
and demands that those laws are respected, if it has previously excluded a certain 
number of citizens from openly deliberating on the validity of those laws by curtail-
ing their right to free speech (Dworkin, 1996; 2009). However, a possible advan-
tage of the European over the American model of regulating free speech is that it 
looks at hate speech as an attempt to exclude certain (usually minority) groups from 
the political community, an exclusion that can be more detrimental to democracy 
than the type of exclusion Dworkin talks about. Additionally, the ban on the use of 
contentious symbols voicing support for totalitarian political projects, especially in 
20 For most recent vocal advocate of applying the American approach to all democratic societies, 
see: Heinze, 2016. For applying this model in Croatia, see: Cvijanović, 2016. 
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cases such as Nazi insignia that also represent symbolic hate speech, confirms the 
state’s commitment to protection of human rights and the democratic ideal of inclu-
sion itself by the removal of anti-democratic and deeply intolerant rhetoric from the 
public space. The historical paradigm for the European model is the experience of 
racist propaganda used by Nazis during the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich 
that fed the politics of genocide, crimes against humanity and the rise of totalitarian 
order (Holmes, 2012). 
Conclusion
Our survey research dealt with citizens’ tendency to legally sanction hate speech, 
as well as contentious symbols associated with fascism and communism, including 
those historically linked to Ustasha or communist movements and regimes. It has 
generally shown that more than 80% would ban direct hate speech that expresses 
violence and discrimination of certain groups, as well as use of Nazi symbols. 
These tendencies even increased from 2016 to 2018. Tendency to ban extreme 
speech reflected through contentious symbols and slogans is significantly lower 
and varies from 47% for the local antifascist slogan Death to Fascism, Freedom 
to the People to 55% for the red star in 2018. Furthermore, from 2016 to 2018 
the proclivity to ban the local fascist slogan For the Homeland Ready significant-
ly increased to 50%, as a sign of growing criticism and aversion. Similar results 
are obtained for local streets names and monuments dedicated to fascist puppet 
state of NDH, while the majority of citizens would not ban antifascist street names 
and monuments. Nevertheless, when we move to recent violent history, relative 
majority of 47% of citizens advocates preservation of the Homeland War monu-
ments that contain the fascist slogan For the Homeland Ready. Such tendency to 
use different, multilayered and sometimes inconsistent historico-political criteria 
is also expressed in the general structure of aggregated tendencies. Chosen predic-
tors show that support of militant democracy can only be applied to the “general 
tendency” to ban symbols of both totalitarian regimes. Moreover, this tendency is 
best predicted by the political cleavage from WWII between fascists and antifas-
cists. In that sense, those who negatively value the leader of NDH, Ante Pavelić, 
positively value the first president of the Republic of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman and 
have more left-wing inclination are more strongly opposed to all anti-democratic 
insignia. This group of “political cleavage” predictors has the highest “influence” 
on the other two proclivities to ban communist and fascist symbols, street names 
and monuments, although in opposite directions. Both of these specific proclivities 
are in accordance with the family political heritage of those Croatians who support 
or oppose them. Another easily discernable insight from our results is the ideo-
logical compactness of those who would like to ban communist symbols and pre-
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serve fascist symbols, street names, and monuments. They show very problematic 
authoritarian, anti-democratic and anti-pluralist attitudes. 
Given the results of the two surveys and our analysis, we can try and answer 
the question what would be the best model of regulating hate speech and extreme 
speech in Croatia. Should the Croatian legal framework regulating this issue be ex-
tended to be more in line with the attitudes of the majority? Is there a need to go be-
yond regulating direct and symbolic hate speech and extend the ban to cover public 
display of contentious symbols of both fascism and communism? Our position is 
that the existing model of regulating different forms of extreme speech is suitable 
for Croatia. The state should ban direct and symbolic hate speech, but refrain from 
prohibiting use of all politically contentious symbols, i.e. communist symbols and 
slogans. Some basic elements of militant democracy – banning anti-democratic po-
litical parties from entering democratic politics and sanctioning hateful public utter-
ances – already exist in the Constitution and the Criminal Code. This allows for legal 
sanctioning of the use of direct and symbolic hate speech. As the right to freedom of 
speech is one of the core values of constitutional democratic order, this right should 
be curtailed only when there are overwhelming reasons to do so. It is far from clear 
that there are such reasons when it comes to banning all contentious symbols. 
The level of restrictions imposed onto public space that militant democracy 
requires should reflect the level of real danger that the democratic order is facing 
at a given time. Although there is a rise in support for far-right movements, popu-
list rhetoric and exclusionary politics in Europe today (and Croatia is no excep-
tion here), the threat to democracy is not as dramatic as it was in late 1930s when 
Loewenstein was advocating militant democracy and comprehensive legal solu-
tions against fascist and authoritarian movements and regimes. Even in countries 
such as Poland and Hungary where there is an open endorsement of anti-pluralist 
and authoritarian policies by their governments, there is hardly a level of paramili-
tary violence, anti-Semitic propaganda and rejection of democratic values and in-
stitutions that marked the period of European politics Loewenstein is describing in 
his two essays. The same is true of Croatia. The core premise of militant democracy 
is to legally defend democratic institutions from their takeover by extreme anti-
democratic organizations by curtailing the rights of assembly, association and free 
speech. In Croatia, far-right movements and political parties invoking authoritarian 
solutions are on the fringes of politics, hence there is no real danger for the demo-
cratic order from the extreme right or the extreme left which is practically non-
existent. It is not very convincing to assume that the majority of Croatian citizens 
would ban both fascist and communist symbols because of their fear of the real pos-
sibility of reemergence of fascist or communist dictatorship. As our analysis shows, 
a better explanation is that citizens’ advocacy for banning these contentious sym-
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bols is rooted in the rejection of negative historical legacy and already determined 
trans-generational trauma (Blanuša, 2015) associated with these symbols. However, 
as pointed earlier by referencing the ruling of ECHR, communist symbols are too 
ambiguous to be read exclusively as voicing a support for totalitarian regimes. Does 
the same argument apply to fascist symbols? The answer is no for two reasons. 
First, such symbols are not ambiguous in any way as they are always an expression 
of ideas and values that are anathema to democratic order. Second, more important-
ly, such symbols promote an exclusionary ideology that denies equal standing to 
members of minority groups based on their ascriptive traits. This is true even of For 
the Homeland Ready: when this slogan is used as a part of commemoration of the 
soldiers who fought in the Homeland War, it is impossible to separate the positive 
value of patriotic struggle for Croatia’s independence from revisionist acceptance 
of the legacy of fascist NDH and the prosecution of the Serbian minority as a legiti-
mate political goal. Croatia is not facing a real threat of an overthrow of the demo-
cratic government by extreme right or extreme left organizations, but we are wit-
nessing a rise in exclusionary political rhetoric, both on fringes and in mainstream 
politics, especially against the minorities. This is good reason for supporting a ban 
on both direct and symbolic hate speech, as well as advocating for a more consistent 
application of laws regulating such speech. 
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